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Abstract 
The growing precariousness of employment across the world has radically altered the 
conditions upon which the representation of workers’ interests has traditionally been built, 
as it has posed challenges for established trade unions: individualized employment and 
fragmented identities have displaced the centrality of the workplace and the employee-
employer relationship in framing collective issues of representation. In this article we 
compare the processes of collective organisation of two groups of precarious workers in the 
transport and delivery sector of Buenos Aires and Dar es Salaam. Through this comparison 
we investigate how existing trade unions structures, industrial relations frameworks, socio-
political contexts and labour processes interact with the processes of workers’ organization 
that take place even in the harsher conditions of informal work, critically engaging with the 
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argument that the growing precariousness of work represents the end of trade unionism as 
we know it. 
Keywords: Labour Process, Precarity, Informal employment, Work, Trade union, 
Transport, Africa, Latin America, Dar es Salaam, Buenos Aires  
 
Introduction1  
The debate on the future of informal and precarious workers and their organization is 
increasingly interesting researchers in the field of industrial relations and the sociology of 
work. The recent publication in this journal of a special issue on precarity represents an 
important step in the ongoing debate on the concept of precarity and on the forms of 
organisation and resistance of workers in precarious conditions. Most importantly, as argued 
by the editors and a number of articles of the special issue, there is a need to go beyond the 
overstretching of ‘precarity’ as a concept, and to look at precarity as a process in order to 
understand how structural contextual variations impact upon subjective experiences (Alberti 
et al, 2018; Choi, 2018; Moore and Newsome, 2018; Smith and Ngai, 2018). Attention must 
be paid to the role of different state and capital regulations in reconfiguring precarity and dis-
empowering workers.  
These conceptual advances and their application to empirical investigation are a 
promising point of departure in shaping future research on precarious workers’ organisational 
forms and strategies, and in overcoming what we suggest as three main limitations of existing 
research on precarity. The first shortcoming is an undue pessimism about the possibilities for 
struggles for rights at work by precarious workers. Standing (2011), for example, in his 
influential (and controversial) thesis about the emergence of the precariat, dismisses the 
possibility that trade unions, as institutions shaped by an adversarial and economistic logic 
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tied to specific employers/workplaces, can defend the interest of precarious workers. Access 
to social protection, rather than workplace struggles, is instead suggested as the progressive 
way forward for precarious workers. Gallin, while less pessimistic about the future relevance 
of trade unions, similarly argues that the main agenda should be to secure ‘protection to the 
unprotected’, rather than ‘formalising the informal’ (Gallin, 2001: 537). The second 
shortcoming is a tendency to a top-down analysis of the study of precarious workers’ agency.  
The debate tends to revolve around the trade union as the exclusive organizational and 
institutional form of workers’ representation, therefore largely ignoring the formation 
processes of workers’ collective organization that always precede, almost by default in the 
case of unorganized informal and precarious workers, the existence of the union form (see 
for instance Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015; Wright, 2013; Thornley, Jefferys, Appay, 2010; 
Heery, 2009). In these accounts, there is little attention to informal and precarious workers 
‘on the ground’ independent action. Rather, these workers largely appear as the passive 
subjects of top down organizing strategies by trade unions in their efforts to organize and 
represent precarious and marginalized workers. Recent studies on precarious migrants’ 
collective organization in London (Jiang and Korkzynsky, 2016; Pero, 2019; Alberti and 
Pero, 2018) focusing on the importance of community in processes of collective identity 
formation have re-habilitated a much-needed bottom up/self-organising perspective in 
industrial relations studies, and certainly represent a welcomed counter-tendency. In this 
article we aim to embed this critique into variations of contexts, thus comparing organizing 
processes in two developing world cities. This in turn leads to the third shortcoming of these 
narratives, namely the lack of attention to contexts, to the labour process, to variations 
between and within regions, and to the different structural and political constraints and 
possibilities that different types of precarious workers might face. 
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In contrast with these narratives, in this article we reflect about the possibilities and 
goals of the political organisation of precarious workers, and the challenges that this entails, 
in a way that is more attentive to the way in which global trends play themselves out in 
individual contexts. The comparison between the two instances of organization of precarious 
worker in Dar es Salaam and Buenos Aires hereby presented, and the interaction with existing 
unions structures and industrial relations frameworks, allows to appreciate the way in which 
such processes are part and parcel of global trends, but, at the same time, are politically, 
institutionally and materially mediated in context-specific ways (Savage, 2002). With others, 
and following the conceptualisation of precarity as a process, we therefore argue that 
precarious workers’ possibilities are dependent on structural conditions of precarity and 
exploitation but are at the same time spatial and contingent, thus influenced by local and 
contextual factors (Kabeer et al., 2013; Mezzadri, 2016; Boampong, 2010; Gunawardana, 
2014; Jenkins, 2013; Ngai, 2006; Chun, 2009). The decade long period through which we 
have been able to observe the development of the cases, have allowed us to focus on the ways 
in which different contextual political and historical processes have shaped the strategies 
used by workers to build power and organisation.          
 The article is divided into four main sections. In the first, we consider the relevance 
of Wright’s distinction between structural and associational workers’ power in identifying 
the sources of workers’ power (Wright, 2000). In the second, we outline the methodological 
rationale of the comparison and the methods used to collect data. In the third and fourth, in 
dialogue with Wright’s framework, the article compares transport workers’ ‘structural 
power’ (both workplace and market power) in the two cities by looking at the relations 
between labour processes and labour markets.  This is followed by the analysis of workers’ 
‘associational power’, highlighting the stark differences in the political contexts of workers’ 
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organisation. The last section concludes by reflecting on the insights that this comparison can 
contribute to broader debates on the construction of precarious workers’ collective 
organization. 
 
Framing workers’ power: theoretical insights for empirical analysis 
There is a long-standing theoretical tradition in the social sciences that emphasises the 
importance of both structure and agency in explaining the nature and dynamics of social and 
class formations (Thompson, 1963; Hobsbwam, 1984; Silver, 2003; Van der Linden, 2008). 
Within it, particularly useful to operationalise the study of labour possibilities is Wright’s 
(2000) widely adopted (Schmaltz and Thiel, 2017; Kabeer et al., 2013; Selwyn, 2007; Silver, 
2003) conceptualisation of the sources of workers’ power. As such, it offers a valid departure 
point in the analysis of processes of workers’ collective formations. According to Wright, 
workers derive their collective power from two possible sources. First is the ‘structural 
power’ that (some) workers command. This derives from workers’ specific ‘location … 
within the economic system’. Following this argument some economies, and some industries 
within them, have more potential to generate labour unrest than others. Two sub-types of 
‘structural power’ are to be considered. The first, named ‘marketplace bargaining power’, is 
the power that workers command due to conditions in the labour market across economic 
industries.  The second, named ‘workplace bargaining power’, relates to the degree of power 
workers can exert in a specific industrial location for their key position in the production 
process. However, workers’ ‘structural power’ does not necessarily result in workers’ 
collective actions. The latter rest on a second source of power, namely ‘associational power’. 
This derives from the political organisation of workers along trade union lines or other 
institutional forms and on the limitations imposed on these forms by the system of legislation 
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and by the historical context of employment relations existing in a certain 
political/geographical location. Thus, there is no straightforward correlation ‘between 
workers’ bargaining power and the actual use by workers of that power to struggle for better 
working and living conditions’ (Silver, 2003: 15). Whether the socio-economic position 
occupied by workers translates into political consciousness and a shared identity however 
may also depend on active efforts, by workers themselves or by outsider activists/leaders, at 
constructing shared notion of injustice and exploitation (Bernstein, 2007; Cohen, 2006; 
Darlington, 2002; Fantasia, 1988; Kelly, 1998). 
In understanding the factors leading to workers’ collective agency, attention to the 
time-space nexus also matters, as protests and organizations have more chances to be 
successful at particular moments in history, when institutions and socially established 
arrangements are generally contested and rules can be partly re-written (Fox Piven and 
Cloward, 1977). As Chun (2009) more recently argued, these are times in which marginalised 
groups of workers, not endowed with structural power, can use the ‘symbolic power’ of 
socially accepted values and concepts of injustice, fairness, equality and social cohesion as 
moral weapons to exert pressure on the state and institutions. The importance of space 
dynamics in framing collective organisation are now increasingly being considered in 
sociological studies of work (McGrath et al., 2010; Manky, 2016).  Probably the most 
important theoretical insight from this tradition is that while capitalist production actively 
produces and reproduces space, it is also contemporaneously producing new field of struggles 
(Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 2006). These insights seem particularly useful in the case of this 
comparison, focusing on the informal work in the transport sector, that is so central to the 
functioning of cities. In it, capitalist dynamics produces precariousness, atomization and 
individualisation of the labour force, thus making workplace organising difficult. However, 
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the city dependence on the continuous circulation and flow of people and commodities and 
the visibility that the interruption of this circulation gives to precarious workers, makes cities’ 
squares, crossroads and streets potential ‘battlefields’, organising spaces for marginalised 
groups to resist precarity.  
 
Methodology 
This article is the result of its two authors’ intellectual exchange which began when they were 
invited, in 2014, to share their research findings about the organization of precarious transport 
workers in Buenos Aires and Dar es Salaam at a workshop organized by the International 
Transport Workers Federation and the Global Labour Institute. The issues analysed and 
questions posed independently in both studies, and their settings, were remarkably similar: 
the sector in which these workers operated (transport); the urban setting (two metropolis in 
capital cities of developing countries, Buenos Aires and Dar es Salaam); the impetus of 
workers to their political organization and, at the same time, the crucial role that was played 
subsequently by existing trade unions to support them; and the complex and tense 
relationship between workers’ grassroots organizations and the established trade unions. At 
the same time, there were major differences between the contexts in which these workers 
operated. Above all, the radical approach taken by transport workers in Buenos Aires to 
confront the state stood in sharp contrast with the less overtly confrontational strategy 
adopted by transport workers in Dar es Salaam. These different mobilizing approaches and 
outcome of workers’ actions opened further questions on the labour process, on the labour 
market and on their politics. 
Research on the organization of informal motorbike delivery transport workers in 
Buenos Aires was carried out in the period 2012-2015, as part of a broader EU project on the 
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organization of precarious workers across sectors (delivery, music events technicians, textile, 
public employees) in the city of Buenos Aires. A qualitative approach has been used in this 
research. In depth interviews (12 in total) with delivery workers and activists about the labour 
process, the collective actions of SIMECA (Sindicato de mensajeros y cadets) and the 
organisation of motoqueros (motorbike) workers have provided the first set of data. Other 
sources have been used to build on the interviews and triangulate information. These sources 
include: analysis of extracts from interviews with three former activists included in a book 
on the history of SIMECA by former motoquero workers (Calvo and Gorini, 2013); online 
youtube videos of marches and demonstrations2; written report and notes published in 
different outlets, such as SIMECA’s flyers collected at the time of interviews and a left-wing 
magazine such as Sudestada; independent press reports;3 and secondary sources (Barattini 
and Pascual, 2011; Rodriguez, 2010). This combination of qualitative sources has made the 
detailed reconstruction of the organizing experience of SIMECA between the end of the 
1990s and 2009 possible. This reconstruction, in particular through former activists’ oral 
histories and interviews, took central place in the methodology adopted dues to the fact that 
at the time of fieldwork, SIMECA no longer existed.  
Research on the organization of bus public transport workers in Dar es Salaam was 
part of a broader study of the political economy of public transport in Dar es Salaam (Rizzo, 
2017). This article draws on fieldwork carried out in 2009, 2011 and 2014 and on a range of 
sources. A review of media coverage of the issue was central to establish the chronology and 
key players of workers’ organisation. Documentation on the interaction between the 
Tanzania Transport Union and the informal workers’ association, which Rizzo was kindly 
allowed to study, provided records on the interaction between the two organisations over 
time, and of the organising strategy that was born out of it. This consisted of hundreds of 
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letters between trade union officers and workers’ organisers, typed speeches given by trade 
union officers and workers’ organisers at meetings with minibus workers, and documents 
outlining the budgets for organising events for which the minibuses organisers asked for trade 
union support. Interviews (10 in total) with the leaders of the workers’ association, of the 
trade union, and with transport workers themselves were then carried out to further 
understand the picture emerging from these sources and to triangulate that with workers’ own 
experience of it.4 
 
Workers’ ‘structural power’: the organization of work and the labour market 
Comparing the organising strategy of these two groups, and different types, of transport 
workers, in Dar es Salaam and in Buenos Aires, requires an understanding of the contexts 
in which they operated and the sources of power and vulnerability that workers derived 
from it. This calls for attention to the way in which work was organised in each context, 
and to the strategies adopted by each group in an effort to challenge the uneven balance of 
power with employers. 
In Dar es Salaam, daladala workers are public transport workers in a city with over 
4 million people and a virtually defunct public sector transport company. The cheapest means 
of public transport is provided by around ten thousand privately-owned minibuses, known as 
daladala. Over 90 percent of these workers, of which the total number is between 20,000 and 
30,000, earn a living by operating buses that they do not own. A clear division between a 
class of bus owners and a class of transport workers therefore characterises bus public 
transport. Bus owners demand a daily rent (hesabu in Swahili) from workers for operating 
the bus. The daily return for workers will consist of whatever remains after the daily rent to 
bus owners, and petrol costs, have been deducted from gross income. In other words, the 
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modalities of remuneration by employers transfer business risks onto the workforce. At the 
beginning of each working day, the profit for bus owners is known, the return for the 
workforce, if any, is uncertain. These workers are neither waged nor piece-workers. Nor 
should one think of them as self-employed micro-entrepreneurs as workers do not own the 
buses. 
Motoqueros workers instead own the means of production, the bikes or motorbike 
they use in the midst of traffic to deliver parcels and food. As owner of the motorbikes they 
are responsible for the maintenance and repair of the machines, thus bearing on them, so to 
speak, the entrepreneurial costs. The work of motoqueros is organised in a way that resemble 
that of taxi drivers.  They work on calls distributed via radio by delivery companies, called 
agencias, to which they normally offer their services. These agencias can be specialised in 
the delivery of parcels and documents or provide a delivery service to other companies 
(especially restaurants and food). While there are agencias which operate in the formal labour 
market, regularly employing workers and respecting the minimum salary level negotiated for 
the sector, the majority of these agencias are often very small and not registered. 
Furthermore, they have been increasingly suffering competition from platform-based 
delivery companies. These differences have implications for the work performed both in 
terms of the geographical area and the time of day of the delivery.       
Notwithstanding these differences in the employment relationship, motoqueros and 
daladala workers share the precarity of their work, and the harshness that derives from it. 
This is rooted in their low marketplace power, which in turn stems from the negative impact 
that an oversupplied labour market has on workers’ bargaining power. The competition in 
the labour market for delivery work is normally high and so is the labour turnover. The sector 
is particularly attractive for young workers as a first time job, offering flexibility in terms of 
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working hours and a relatively easy of entry in the sector given that the capital necessary to 
buy a second hand motorbike is affordable to many (1000 US$, about three time the 
minimum wage). However, the high level of informality existing in the sector and the piece 
rate system used as form of payment do not normally guarantee a dignified salary. This forces 
workers to increase the rhythms of work (high speed drive, long shifts) and as a consequence 
the probability of life-threatening road accident (‘Basta de mensajeros muertos’, Stop the 
killing of motoqueros! says banners in various marches organised by SIMECA). For the dirty, 
polluted and dangerous nature of their work, workers called themselves ‘the miners of the 
XXI century’, as argued by a former SIMECA’s activist (Atzeni, 2012c).  
Differently from motoqueros, the vast majority of daladala workers, as we have seen, 
do not own the buses on which they work. This, in addition to the relatively unskilled nature 
of work on buses and to the fact that the labour market for unskilled work is grossly 
oversupplied in Tanzania, subject daladala workers to fierce competition for work with 
pernicious consequences on working conditions and returns from work. Over 80 per cent of 
its workforce has primary level education. The existence of an oversupply of unskilled job 
seekers significantly tilts the balance of power between bus owners and bus workers in the 
former’s favour. As one worker put it:  
‘As too many of us are jobless, if for instance a bus owner is looking for a driver, he 
will find more than fifty people just at this station. That is why they can ask you 
whatever they want and you have to accept it. I worked with the same bus for two 
years. He used to ask me for 50,000 shillings every day. Over time the buses became 
too many and the chance of making money decreased. I went to my employer and I 
told him 50,000 was not possible anymore. He could not understand me and he 
wanted his bus keys back. He gave the bus to somebody else and he is still working 




Meagre returns, harsh working conditions (the average working day lasts 15 hours and the 
working week more than 6.5 days), and occupational uncertainty (as work on a given bus 
lasts less than 8 months on average) are the main traits of exploitation that transport workers 
in Dar es Salaam share with workers at the lower end of the informal economy. Financially 
squeezed by bus owners, workers’ attempt to maximise return from work by overloading the 
buses, by denying boarding to passengers entitled to social fares and by speeding. As another 
worker explains, the latter has particularly pernicious consequences:  
‘If I drive without speeding I will work for the whole day to gain only the money the 
owner wants back at the end of the day. For these reasons we are forced to speed from 
5 a.m. to 9 p.m. Then they say too many accidents, how much energy should we 
have?’ (Rizzo, 1998a) 
 
 
Thus, the trademarks of the infamous work on daladala are remarkably similar to those of 
work on the delivery motorbikes in Buenos Aires. The cause for the occupational precarity 
faced by these two group of workers is also similar, namely their limited “marketplace 
power”. 
While both these groups of workers had low “marketplace power”, there were 
substantial differences in the ‘workplace power’ - as we have seen, the other sub-type of 
‘structural power’- that they commanded. Dar es Salaam workers had considerable 
workplace power. As private buses have long constituted the only means of (barely 
affordable) motorised public transport available to the public, unrest by its workforce 
would seriously affect the mobility of the vast majority of Dar es Salaam’s population. In 
Buenos Aires, motoqueros’ workplace power was limited, as they had no control of the 
market for the delivery of small goods, thus ruling out strikes – or the threat of them – as a 
weapon to bring the city’s economy to a halt.  
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Notwithstanding these differences in ‘workplace power’, in both contexts the 
harshness of work and the need of mitigating its pernicious consequences, conditions that all 
workers experienced, provided ground for the emergence of solidarity and for the 
establishment of the first associational forms. Crucially, attempts to organise to resist 
precarity would later draw on these pre-existing associations and networks of solidarity. As 
a motoquero put it:   
‘When, after a rainy winter week, you finally arrive to a Friday afternoon to drink a 
mate (typical Argentine infusion) with the other guys that have suffered like you, this 
produces very strong, very human ties, which later on in the street get transformed 
into solidarity….our job is highly individual, you are alone in the street, the boss 
threaten you, cars crowd you, police ask for bribe and the only person that can help 
you is another delivery worker who has experienced the same situations as you did’ 
(Interview with Lulo, quoted in Calvo and Gorini, 2013). 
 
Streets, squares, and local bars were the meeting places for the informal and spontaneous 
workers gatherings in small groups. Within these groups, workers shared beers, mate and 
marijuana. They also supported each other to deal with mechanical problems with their 
motorbike, and aired stories and complaints about payments and working conditions, creating 
a motoquero identity: ‘We used to say that SIMECA could have remained without a building, 
since it was in every place each of us was in. Each motoquero was the union’ (Atzeni, 2012b). 
The consolidation of SIMECA as the trade union representing delivery workers drew on these 
first collective forms of self-help and self-organisation. In many cases the same persons that 
were part of these sharing and solidarity networks constituted in the cities’ streets were also 
playing an active role in the structure of the organisation, which had at its peak 400 activists 
spread across the city (Atzeni, 2012a and 2012b).  
Similarly, in Dar es Salaam daladala workers in many routes of the city had already 
organised informally. In some routes, typically those with limited overlap with other routes, 
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workers took advantage of their de facto monopoly of service. By creating a queuing 
system to board passengers at beginning of the route, and by paying a small fee each time a 
full bus left for its ride, they generated a saving fund. Associational funds were then used at 
times of members’ need, such as to support the burial of workers’ nuclear family members, 
to pay for health expenditure and to bribe authorities when members had been arrested by 
the police for work-related offences.5 The recruitment strategy of the informal workers 
association, named Umoja wa Madereva na Makondakta wa Mabasi ya Abiria Dar es 
Salaam (UWAMADAR), drew heavily on these experiences of workers’ self-organisation, 
as its recruitment drives relied on transport workers who were part of these informal 
associations. Leaders were identified at individual stations/routes and educated about the 
association’s broad mission and more discrete goals. It was then the branch leaders’ task to 
recruit more members. Such a strategy provided workers with some leadership over the 
recruitment drive. Evidence suggests this approach raises the chances of success in 
organising informal sector workers (Gallin, 2001; Bonner and Spooner, 2011). 
 
Workers’ ‘associational power’ and the political context of workers’ organisation 
Understanding how workers organise requires not only a comparison between the labour 
markets in which they operated, but also a comparison between the associational power that 
these workers commanded, and more broadly between the political landscapes of the two 
countries. These mediated the way in which workers’ organization consolidated, the realm 
of possibility of their collective action and workers’ strategy of engagement with the state 
and employers in their struggle against precarity. 
The political climate was starkly different in the two cities, and, in the case of Buenos 
Aires, it also radically changed over time. SIMECA, started to operate as the organization of 
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delivery workers in 1999, initially, as a simple de facto association of workers, and later on 
as a registered (though not recognized) union. However, the Argentinean 2001 crisis 
contributed to boost the growth and prominence of SIMECA. From 1997 Argentina entered 
a deep economic recession that created high unemployment, the flexibility of labour 
contracts, the reduction of pensions and benefits which were resisted by various social forces 
(state and municipal employees, the unemployed movement and territorially based 
organizations, left political groups, trade unions) with marches, strikes and roadblocks that 
grew in intensity following the worsening economic conditions of the country (Dinerstein, 
2002; Grigera, 2006). Such turmoil offered a fertile environment and source of examples of 
action for the construction of SIMECA. The years preceding the riots of December 2001, 
when the crisis exploded, and soon after, was a period of permanent social protest and direct 
confrontation of social organisations with the state and its repressive apparatus. This helped 
to develop methods of struggle based on the use of direct action and bottom-up decision-
making processes based on the idea of horizontality. SIMECA used actions such as 
roadblocks, occupations of employers’ premises and of public spaces to make visible to 
public authorities the conditions of exploitation of their work and to ask for employment 
formalisation.6 SIMECA also link directly working conditions the death of workers. “What 
we say in relation to precarity is that it literarily does kill us (Compañeros de SIMeCa, Revista 
Pampa, November 2009: 8, quoted in Calvo and Gorini, 2013: 7). 
The political landscape changed following the stabilization of the economy and 
sustained economic growth since 2003, with important consequences on the possibilities for 
workers’ action and their attitude and relationship with employers and the state. As an activist 
argued:  
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‘At the beginning we used to say that we did not need state recognition, we could put 
400 motorbikes in front of the Ministry of Labour and set it on fire. We were not 
interested in being defined as a union or not, we were the motorbikers! In 2001 we 
were not interested, we had our people on the street, making barricades against the 
bourgeois legality, we went to the front, no problem, the matter was easy. After this 
we started to realize that we could not sign a collective agreement, we were gaining 
conflicts against the employers but we were nothing’ (Atzeni, 2012a). 
 
SIMECA was subsequently registered as a union by the Ministry of Labour. However, 
registration in itself does not grant to new unions the legal authorization to negotiate in 
collective bargaining. In Argentina union recognition is in fact granted by the Ministry of 
Labour exclusively to one representative organization per economic or productive sector, 
thus operating under a monopoly of representation (called “personeria gremial”).  This makes 
union recognition a very lengthy and disputed process. The political opportunity of the 
moment, the absence/presence of overlapping claims for the representation of the same 
groups of workers by already existing unions, and the political alignment of the new union 
attempting to claim recognition play an important role in it.  
The changing economic and political context imposed a change in the strategies and 
targets of SIMECA, shifting away from violent direct action towards pressure strategies 
aiming to formally represent workers and more centred on dialogue with employers and the 
state. This imposed a reconfiguration of the relation with the state, the need to conform to its 
rules and institutions, most notably the formal process of union recognition, and the 
acceptance of the central role of the state in the ‘political’ arbitration of labour conflicts.  
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However, SIMECA’s attempts at organizing the sector’s workers along the lengthy 
and politically mediated institutional path proved fruitless. In 2009, the government granted 
the right of workers’ representation to a newly formed trade union, ASIMM ( Asociación 
Sindical de Motociclistas mensajeros y servicios). ASIMM was affiliated to CGT 
(Confederación General del Trabajo), the most important trade union confederation, 
traditionally identified with Peronism, and which was supporting the government at that 
time. ASIMM official recognition was arguably part of a political deal between the 
government and the CGT aimed at reducing the power and relevance of independent unions 
(Atzeni and Ghigliani, 2013). The formal recognition granted to ASIMM implied the 
illegality of any other existing organisation attempting to take action in defence of ASIMM 
members. This had an influence on the disappearance of SIMECA as an active 
organisation. However, the recognition also brought about improvements in salaries and 
working conditions for many workers of the sector, achieving some of the demands for 
which SIMECA had struggled in the previous years. Therefore, while ASIMM, thanks to 
the political tutelage of the CGT leadership, was formally effective in gaining rights for 
workers, it did so by ripping off the fruits of the decade long existence of SIMECA, whose 
struggles were thus effective in producing collective consciousness, identity and public 
awareness of the conditions of delivery workers and in forcing government to take action. 
In the words of one SIMECA’s activist, ‘This union (ASIMM) exists just because SIMECA 
existed’ (Interview with Javier, quoted in Calvo and Gorini, 2013). As a result of these 
developments, of the formalization of the sector, in 2016 one part of delivery sector 
workers had been formalised and were covered by collective contracts regulating their 
salaries, working conditions and rights of association.  
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The political context was very different in Dar es Salaam and in Tanzania. There, 
workers’ efforts to organise were located in politically stable landscape, as the ruling party, 
the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) first and the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 
later held power within a one-party political system since 1961, and by winning each multi-
party election held in the country since 1995. While not free of tensions, Tanzania’s political 
trajectory from the late 1990s to the present does not exhibit the patterns of social unrest and 
political upheaval of the scale and the intensity of the Argentinean crisis. This clearly affected 
the type of strategy adopted by workers to make demands on employers and the state. At the 
same time, as we have seen, Dar es Salaam transport workers commanded higher workplace 
power than their Argentinian counterparts and this presented workers with a different set of 
opportunities, and more leverage, to put pressure on the state, employers and the public 
through protest/action. As privately-owned buses constitute the only means of (barely 
affordable) motorised public transport available to the public, a strike would seriously affect 
the mobility of the vast majority of Dar es Salaam commuters with immediate knock-on 
effects on virtually every economic activity in the city, and beyond. Furthermore, at a 
discursive level, workers exploited the public nature of the service provided by transport 
workers, by linking the poor condition of public transport in Dar to that of its workers, as 
part of the strategy was to frame their interests as part of a wider societal ‘common good’. 
The institutional channels that the workers’ organisation had to follow in Tanzania 
were similar to those in Argentina, as even in this country the state held a tight control over 
associational life. So, when, in 1997, a small group of daladala workers set out to investigate 
the steps required to formalize the association set up by a group of 40 workers, it found that, 
according to Tanzanian law, trade unions were the only institutions entitled to represent 
workers vis-à-vis employers or the government. It was this finding that led these 
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UWAMADAR’s workers to seek a partnership with the Tanzanian Transport Workers 
Union. The cooperation between UWAMADAR, and the transport union was thus forced by 
the legal framework regulating associationism in Tanzania.  
The partnership between the two institutions took considerable investment from both 
sides. It was fraught with tensions yet productive in advancing the struggle against precarity. 
From 1997 to April 2000, when the workers’ association was formally registered by the 
Tanzanian state, several meetings between representatives of the two institutions were 
devoted to build a shared understanding of the exploitation experienced by daladala workers, 
and to devise a strategy to demand labour rights from employers and to engage the state in 
the process. The union support to the workers’ association took the form of legal advice on 
how to draw its constitution - through several rounds of revisions - so that the Tanzanian 
Registrar of Society would approve it, and   consisted also in financial support to organise 
meetings so that UWAMADAR could begin an outreach campaign to recruit members.  
Once the workers’ association had been legally registered, in the process becoming 
an affiliated of COTWUT, the struggle against workers’ precarity gathered momentum. The 
two parties’ strategy to bring to an end precarious work had to reflect the fact that daladala 
workers’ ‘structural power’ had limits. The possibility of a strike was constrained in a context 
of oversupply of unskilled labourers since workers on strike without contracts could be easily 
victimised by employers and lose their job. Due to these political and economic 
circumstances, one can understand why workers, through their own association and in 
partnership with the transport union, had to rely on a less confrontational form of pressure 
on employers to trigger the involvement of the state to mediate between the two parties. Year 
after year, in the period from 2008 to 2011, workers organised wild-cat strikes and walk-outs 
(Nipashe, 9 June 2008, The Citizen, 7 December 2009; Tanzania Daima, 29 March 2010; 
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Habari Leo, 6 April 2011). Typically, the press would report an imminent strike by daladala 
workers, UWAMADAR and COTWUT leaders would distance themselves from such action, 
and yet on the day of the industrial action public transport would be disrupted by the 
withdrawal of workers from service for part of the day. Those workers who chose not to 
adhere to the strike were target by stones attacks from colleagues (The Citizen, 10 December 
2009). Passengers’ complaints about travel disruptions to public authorities then put pressure 
on the state to facilitate the negotiations between bus owners and their workers (Rizzo, 2011). 
Crucially, the form of protest chosen reflected both the strength and weaknesses of the 
workers: it drew on their ‘structural power’ and yet it did not over-exposed workers. Such 
actions were strong enough to force Dar es Salaam authorities to intervene in the dispute 
without making workers’ vulnerable to retaliation by employers.  
The partnership between the workers’ association and the transport union rested on a 
clear division of labour whereby the union supported the cause of daladala workers ‘from 
above’. This entailed drawing on its technical expertise in labour law and on its political 
connections. The workers’ association main role was to recruit members to give credibility 
to unionists lobbying from above, and to lead them when direct action was deployed to trigger 
the need for negotiation by employers or the state. ‘Talking to drivers and conductors, one 
by one, ‘You have been doing this job for many years. Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow 
how will it look?’ (Rizzo, 2009). So there was an element of sensitising workers to the 
importance of employment contracts, and of trying to break the short-term time horizon of 
daladala workers’ attitude to work that was both an effect and a cause of workers’ 
occupational precariousness. The albeit small financial support from the Union to hold events 
at which UWAMADAR could advertise its agenda is worth noting here, as it suggests that 
the Union was prepared to invest some of its funds to promote the organisation of informal 
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workers. This helped, in a small but significant way, to partly address UWAMADAR’s lack 
of funds and the lack of visibility that came with it.7 
UWAMADAR’s outreach drive was extremely successful, as in 2003 the 
organisation had 5,236 members, or about 44 per cent of the total (estimated) workforce of 
daladala (UWAMADAR, Konrad Stiftung, DDI, 2003: 23).8 Such numbers conferred 
legitimacy to UWAMADAR, and allowed transport unionist to start to lobby for 
employment contracts for daladala workers. Over the years, the achievements of this 
coalition were substantive, as the public transport regulation changed from a starting point 
in which the existence of a public transport informal workforce was not formally 
recognised by the state, to one in which each bus owners had to register the contract of its 
workers in order to obtain a public transport licence. Despite this, workers leaders were 
aware that the issuing of contracts would not be straightforward, as attempts to non-comply 
with regulation by employers were likely. Still, as the COTWUT Deputy General Secretary 
put it, bus owners’ room for manoeuvre in avoiding labour regulations was progressively 
shrinking: ‘the day that an owner gets into an argument with his driver, and is asked to 
produce the contract, he will be in trouble’ (Rizzo, 2011). 
Difficulties in holding employers to account, however, resulted in renewed and 
unsolvable tensions between the workers’ association and the trade union, ultimately causing 
the end of the partnership between the two. Leaders of the informal workers association grew 
disillusioned about the necessity of their partnership with the trade union, as they doubted its 
effectiveness in the continued struggle for labour rights. As UWAMADAR General 
Secretary recalled, ‘the service that we were getting was small, and our needs to be looked 
after where not satisfied’ (Rizzo, 2014). UWAMADAR leaders, together with those of the 
association of upcountry bus workers (UWAMATA), exited COTWUT and established a 
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new trade union, the Tanzania Road Transport Workers Union (TARWOTU). This was 
officially registered in January 2013.9 COTWUT General Secretary had little sympathy for 
the argument that his union neglected the interests of daladala workers. Instead, he suggested 
that the real motive behind UWAMADAR leaders’ decision to start a new union was: ‘the 
ambition to lead. [It] sometimes drives change, the desire to be the General Secretary of a 
national union. Otherwise, why not use a network that is already in place?’  (Rizzo, 2011).  
 
Conclusions 
Bringing the article to a close, we reflect on the lessons that can be learned from this 
comparison. The lack of attention to contexts and their specificities, an excessive pessimism 
about the possibilities for struggles for rights at work in informalized labour markets and an 
excessive focus on trade unions as the only vehicle for workers’ organisation, were the three 
shortcomings in the literature on informal and precarious labour which we highlighted at the 
outset. The first concluding remark is that our comparison exposes the significance of these 
shortcomings, as in both cases we have seen how groups of informal and unorganised 
workers have been able to improve their income and working conditions by collective 
organisation and struggles for employment rights vis-à-vis their employers and the state. This 
goes against claims that the only way forward for precarious workers is public policies and 
legislation for social protection. The cases also demonstrate how the construction of 
collective organisation, rather than a top-down process initiated by trade unions, has been 
instead the result of gradual processes of workers’ power formation initiated by workers, and 
for which trade union support was important afterword, albeit with tensions.  Importantly, in 
both cases, due to different and context-specific political landscapes, existing legislation on 
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workers’ representation forced self-organised groups to adopt the trade union form and 
follow trade union paths of organisation.  
 The second lesson that can be learned from our comparison concerns the 
relationship between workers’ self-organisation and trade unions, both its importance for 
the effective representation of workers’ interests and the tensions that tend to characterise 
such relationship. In both cases, on the one hand, workers’ impetus to the process of 
organisation was crucial to its vibrancy and early successes; on the other hand, there were 
significant limitations to the gains which workers’ own organisation could achieve without 
the support of trade unions. At the same time, trade union support, legal, financial and in 
terms of know-how to navigate state authorities, while important in advancing the cause of 
workers in both contexts, took away impetus and/or radicalism from workers’ earlier 
organisation. The tensions that characterised the relationship between established trade 
unions and workers organisation, leading SIMECA to cease to exist in Buenos Aires, and 
UWAMADAR to break the partnership with the transport union in Dar es Salaam, were 
thus a reflection of the complex and ambivalent forces linking trade unions to informal 
workers’ own organisations. They are two instances of the recurrent tension between 
institutionalisation and mobilization in the construction of workers’ power.    
The third and final point to learn from our comparison concerns the value of the late 
Wright’s framework on the sources of workers’ power. This framework helped us to 
understand forms of precarity and struggles to overcome it in the informal economies of 
cities in developing countries.  Wright’s conceptualisation of  workers’ ‘structural’ and 
‘associational’ power has been a fertile starting point and guiding framework of this 
article’s attempt to locate a fine-grained understanding of conditions and possibilities in 
time and in two contexts. The two groups of workers analysed have similarly weak 
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‘marketplace power’, due to unskilled labour oversupply, and different ‘workplace’ power, 
due to the different type of transport work performed. These workers also experienced 
similar trajectories in terms of ‘associational’ power, with a transition from workers’ self-
organisation to trade unionism. This was both beneficial to the advance of workers’ 
interests and yet not void of set-backs and, to some extent, disempowered workers’ 
organisations. What can be learned from this comparison then? Perhaps the most important 
lesson here is that it would be foolish to expect a framework on workers’ power to predict 
the outcomes of workers struggles, as they are necessarily open-ended. Instead, the 
analytical and political value of this framework is that it can help to understand and 
compare the messy labour markets inhabited by precarious workers and the possibilities 
and pitfalls of organising for workers’ rights in them. 
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